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This paper investigates the extent to which investors anticipate bidder and target ﬁrm merger candidacy and if
investor anticipations about candidacy affect the distribution of announcement period returns between bidder and target
ﬁrm shareholders. We link anticipations about merger candidacy to stock price announcement period returns using a two-
stage model with an adjustment for simultaneous equations bias. The selection equations model bidder and target
candidacy. The structural equations model bidder and target cumulative abnormal returns around merger announce-
ments. We then investigate if and how predictability in merger candidacy affects bidder and target cumulative abnormal
returns.
We ﬁnd that investors can predict bidder ﬁrms more successfully than target ﬁrms. As a result, some bidder ﬁrm, merger-related
information is stale at the time of announcement. However, the information that merger announcements reveal about targets is less
stale. As a consequence of the difference in the freshness of information revealed at a merger announcement, it is not surprising that
previous research has found that target ﬁrm CARs are larger in magnitude than bidder CARs. Without controlling for differences in
predictability of merger candidacy, it is incorrect to conclude that target shareholders capture the majority of the value gains that
mergers generate. Oncewe account for greater predictability in bidder ﬁrm candidacy, the difference between bidder and target ﬁrm
three-day cumulative abnormal returns around a merger announcement decreases signiﬁcantly. Thus, the evidence supports the
hypothesis that to someextent asymmetry in investor anticipations aboutmerger candidacy causes disparity in bidder and targetﬁrm
announcement period abnormal returns.rnett), basak@bilkent.edu.tr (B. Tanyeri), hassan.tehranian@bc.edu (H. Tehranian).
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596 M.M. Cornett et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (2011) 595–611Surveying merger studies, Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell et al. (1988), and Andrade et al. (2001) report that
announcement period cumulative abnormal returns to target ﬁrm shareholders are substantial (around 20%), whereas
cumulative abnormal returns to bidder ﬁrm shareholders are insigniﬁcant (around 0%). Netter et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the
ﬁlters used to construct bidder and target samples signiﬁcantly affect CARs. In their sample, that covers 288,406 deals,
three-day bidder CARs are signiﬁcant at 1%: acquirer returns at the deal announcement are negative only when studies
screen down to large public ﬁrms buying large public ﬁrms. However, Netter et al. note that, over their period of study,
deals of over a $1 billion make up only 2.0% of the transactions, but 70.2% of the reported deal values. Thus, the question
remains, why target shareholders seem to be enjoying the majority of value generated in the vast majority (measured by
deal value) of mergers.1 A crucial assumption in event studies of merger announcements is that investors learn merger-
related information in a short window of time. However, if investors can predict merger announcements, this important
assumption is violated. Indeed, Billett and Qian (2008) ﬁnd evidence that the market anticipates future acquisition deals
based on the CEO's acquisition history and impounds such anticipation into stock prices. Similarly, Song and Walkling
(2000) ﬁnd that rivals of initial acquisition targets earn abnormal returns because of the increased probability that they will
be targets themselves. To the extent that investors anticipate bidder and target ﬁrm candidacy, abnormal returns around
merger announcements do not measure the market's full assessment of the beneﬁts that shareholders enjoy. Within the
event window, announcement period abnormal returns measure investors' responses only to unanticipated information
that announcements convey.
Several empirical studies investigate investor anticipations in the context of merger programs (Schipper and Thompson
(1983), Asquith et al. (1983), Malatesta and Thomson (1985), Fuller et al. (2002), Ismail (2005), and Song and Walkling
(2000, 2008)). The focus of these studies is to ﬁnd a single characteristic that differentiates anticipated and unanticipated
bidder ﬁrms or anticipated and unanticipated target ﬁrms. These papers then develop a candidacy model that is limited to a
single instrumental variable. Edmans et al. (2009) also look at investor anticipation of a single ﬁrm. However, they take a
unique approach in which a ﬁrm's discount to its potential value signiﬁcantly attracts takeovers (the trigger effect), but
market expectations of an acquisition cause the discount to shrink (the anticipation effect). Even if a low valuation attracts
an acquisition, a high valuation may indicate that the market believes an acquisition is probable, thus attenuating any
relationship between valuation and takeover probability found in the data. They call the combination of these effects the
feedback loop. While the examination of a single ﬁrm as a bidder or target candidate represents an easy and intuitive way to
address investor anticipations, a model that considers the effect of investor anticipations about both bidder and target
candidacy, rather than on either bidder or target candidacy, and that allows for multiple motives of mergers, can more
accurately measure investor anticipations about candidacy.2
The contribution of this paper is fourfold: i) we investigate the effect of investor anticipations on both bidder and target
candidacy, rather than on either bidder or target candidacy, to allow us to examine how any value that mergers generate is divided
between bidder and target shareholders, ii) we develop a more complete model of investor anticipations of both bidder and target
ﬁrm candidacy by incorporating multiple merger motives; iii) we analyze how investor anticipations about candidacy affect stock
price responses to merger announcements; and iv) we investigate what stock price responses to merger announcements reveal
about managerial motives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the research methodology and describes the data.
Sections 3 and 4 report and interpret results of the models of merger candidacy and merger announcement cumulative abnormal
returns, respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Methodology and data
This section develops the two-equation framework used tomodel investor anticipations of merger candidacy and of bidder and
target ﬁrm abnormal returns at a merger announcement. The sample used to test the model is then described.
2.1. Two-equation model of investor anticipation of and stock price responses to merger announcements
Managers choose to merge only when it serves their interests. Thus, investors observe merger announcements only when
manager merger-related beneﬁts are sufﬁciently high. Prior to a merger announcement, investors can only assess observable
information about motives of ﬁrm management to merge. Accordingly, Eq. (1) models managerial choice to be or not to be
involved in a merger. Speciﬁcally, we let MS* (S=B−Bidder, T−T arg et, N−Nonmerging ﬁrm)denote imperfectly observable
beneﬁts that ﬁrmmanagement realizes from bidding, receiving bids, and abstaining frommergers, respectively. The regressors, X1,
are ﬁrm and industry characteristics that investors might use to measure managerial merger-related beneﬁts and X1γS are1 Bhagat et al. (2005) ﬁnd that bidders on average pay the fair value for shares they purchase in tender offers. Their model ﬁnds that improvements from
tender offers are on average perceived by investors to be positive and substantially larger than estimates from previous studies.
2 Cremers et al. (2009) create a “takeover factor,” buying (selling) ﬁrms with a high (low) takeover likelihood, which generates “abnormal” returns. They ﬁnd
that the takeover factor helps explain cross-sectional differences in equity returns. If ﬁrms are more likely to acquire when there is more free cash or lower
required rates of return, the targets become more sensitive to shocks to cash ﬂows or the price of risk. Ceteris paribus, ﬁrms exposed to takeovers have different
rates of return than protected ﬁrms.
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beneﬁts in state S.3 It sh
the exteMS = X1γS + εS; if M

B N max MT ; MNð Þ the firm proposes a merger bid
if MT N max MB; MNð Þ the firm solicits = recieves a merger bid
if MN N max MT ; MBð Þ the firm abstains from merger activity
ð1ÞInvestors cannot directly observe managerial motives or beneﬁts associated with a state (MS*). However, investors do observe
merger announcements.We deﬁneM as an indicator variable that takes a value of 0 if a ﬁrm proposes at least onemerger bid in the
next year, 1 if a ﬁrm solicits/receives at least onemerger bid in the next year, and 2 if a ﬁrm neither proposes nor receives a merger
bid in the next year. We then run multinomial regressions of M on predictors of merger candidacy, X, to estimate investor's
anticipations of bidder and target candidacy.
In turn, merger announcements disclose previously unobservable information about motives of ﬁrmmanagement to investors.
Managerial motives mix a desire to generate shareholder value with the pursuit of opportunistic beneﬁts that are good for bidder
ﬁrmmanagers but may destroy ﬁrm value. If investors determine that managerial motives to merge emphasize shareholder value
creation, bidder ﬁrm stock price responses to merger announcements should be positive. If investors determine that managers are
predominantly pursuing opportunistic beneﬁts with a merger that result in ﬁrm value reductions, stock price responses to merger
announcement surprises should be negative. Thus, managers may be motivated to merge in order to generate shareholder value
and/or to pursue opportunistic beneﬁts that beneﬁt managers but destroy ﬁrm value. Thus, investors observe merger
announcements (i.e., M takes on a value of zero or one) only when manager merger-related beneﬁts are sufﬁciently high
(MB* Nmax(MT* ,MN* ) or MT* Nmax(MB* ,MN* )). As a result, merger announcements disclose direct information about the merger as
well as indirect information about managerial motives driving the merger.
Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively, model bidder and target cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) that are conditional on ﬁrms
proposing or receiving a merger bid (i.e., CARB|MB* Nmax(MT* ,MN* ) and CART|MT* Nmax(MB* ,MN* )). In this model, merger
announcements reveal previously unknown information such as the identity of the merger partners and terms of the merger
contract (X2B andX2T), as well as about previously unobservable managerial motives (εB|MB* Nmax(MT* ,MN* )and εT|MT* Nmax(MB* ,
MN
* )). The inferences drawn about managerial motives for a merger inﬂuence how investors price the post-announcement
enterprise. Finally, ηBand ηT are the error terms in the regression equations.CARB jMB N 0 = X2BβB + εB jMB N max MT ; MN
 Þ + ηB;
 ð2Þ
CART jMT N 0 = X2TβT + εT jMT N max MB ; MN
 Þ + ηT :
 ð3ÞA problem with the model in Eqs. (2) and (3) is that we are using a nonrandomly selected sample to estimate behavioral
relationships surrounding the choice to merge. That is, we analyze only those ﬁrms that chose to enter a merger. We do not (and
cannot) identify and analyze those ﬁrms that chose not to enter a merger. This procedure results in a speciﬁcation bias that arises
because of a missing data problem, i.e., the regressions estimated on the selected sample of merging ﬁrms do not estimate
population regression functions. In other words, the regressions in Eqs. (2) and (3) suffer from a simultaneous equations bias in
that they confound the behavioral parameters of interest with parameters of the function determining the probability of entrance
into the sample.
Heckman (1979) develops a two-stage binary-choice selection model that estimates behavioral functions using least squares
methodology and is free from this simultaneous equations bias. Speciﬁcally, Heckman's “lambda” adjusts for the simultaneous
equations bias that arises in a single-equation structural model when the structural and selection equations are inﬂuenced by the
same variables. Lee (1982 and 1983) develops a two-stage polychotomous-choice selection model in which the merger decision is
a polychotomous choice. Lee (1982) develops an instrumental variable (henceforth, the surprise instrument, SI, which is intuitively
the counterpart of Heckman's lambda in a polychotomous-choice selectionmodel) using the parameter estimates of the candidacy
model. We use Lee's (1982) procedure to study how investor anticipations inﬂuence stock market responses to merger
announcements. Speciﬁcally, in the bidder and target CAR Eqs. (2) and (3), the surprise instruments are inverse transformations of
the probability that a ﬁrm proposes or receives a merger bid, respectively. The greater the surprise in the merger announcement,
the greater is the information revealed about unanticipated merger motives, and the larger is the surprise instrument.3 Hence, the
surprise instrument is a measure of the extent to which a merger announcement surprises the market. As in Lee (1983), we
letsurprise instrumentS =
φ Φ1 FS X1γSð Þð Þ
 
FS X1γSð Þ
; S = B; T;ould be noted here that since the surprise instrument is a function of the error term from the ﬁrst stage regression, it only captures the market surprise to
nt that the econometric speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst stage matches investors’ perception about bidder and target candidacy.
where
4 How
5 The
6 The
tender
categor
databas
interest
acquisit
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FS X1γSð Þ = Prob εSbεð Þ:Thus, Eqs. (4) and (5) represent second stage structural models of bidder and target CARs, respectively:CARB jMB N 0 = X2BβB + SIBβSI;B + SIBDBCARβSI;BCAR + ηB; ð4Þ
CART jMT N 0 = X2TβT + SITβSI;T + SITDTCARβSI;TCAR + ηT : ð5ÞA priori we cannot assign a negative or positive coefﬁcient estimate to the surprise instrument.4 This is because unanticipated
motives for a merger can be a mix of the manager's motives to generate shareholder value and to obtain opportunistic managerial
beneﬁts. The coefﬁcient on the surprise instrument would be positive when investors assess that manager's motives for entering a
merger are to promote the interests of shareholders more than to obtain opportunistic beneﬁts that would harm share value. The
coefﬁcient on the surprise instrument would be negative when investors assess that manager's motives for entering a merger are
to obtain opportunistic beneﬁts that would harm share value more than to promote the interests of shareholders. In other words,
anticipated destructive deals should have a negative coefﬁcient on the surprise instrument (and positive for value enhancing
deals). This suggests that the variance of reactions is also a function of the surprise. To address this, we generate an indicator
variable that takes the value one when CAR is positive and zero when CAR is negative (DBCARand DTCAR). We then interact this
variable with the surprise instrument in bidder and target regressions. Thus, the coefﬁcient on the surprise instrument is for
negative CAR deals, while the coefﬁcient on the surprise instrument plus the coefﬁcient on the interaction variable is for positive
CAR deals.
Econometrically, the functional form of the surprise instrument (or Heckman's lambda) allows for the identiﬁcation of the two-
stage selection model. Further, the same set of variables can be used in the selection and structural equations, and both equations
would be correctly identiﬁed. Regardless, there are some variables that drive the merger decision without affecting CARs and vice
versa. The isolation of these variables in the appropriate model (selection or structural) provides a stronger basis for identifying
the model. For example, prior to a merger announcement, investors estimate managerial motives for a merger using publicly
available information. Accordingly, to predict candidacy we only use information that is publicly available prior to a merger
announcement. We do not include information on the items of negotiations, merger terms, and merger ﬁt in the selection model
since investors do not have access to this information prior to the announcements. Conversely, we exclude information that is
publicly available prior to a merger announcement from the model of CARs because in efﬁcient markets, share prices should
already reﬂect this information (e.g., acquirer size or performance). Accordingly, to evaluate merger announcement CARs, we use
only information that becomes available at the merger announcement: items of negotiation, merger terms, ﬁt between merger
partners, and unanticipatedmerger motives. Finally, we useWhite's (1980) heteroscedasticity correction in the OLS regressions of
bidder and target CARs by clustering on ﬁrm identity.
2.2. Sample data
The sample examined in this paper includes both merging and non-merging ﬁrms. The sample of public and private merging
ﬁrms is compiled from the Security Data Company's (henceforth SDC) USMergers and Acquisitions database. The sample includes
those completed mergers announced between July 1, 19795 and December 31, 2004. We focus only on mergers that transfer
control rights from the target to the bidder ﬁrm. Intent to transfer control rights is characterized by two conditions: i) the bidder
owns less than 50% of outstanding target shares prior to the merger, and ii) the bidder proposes to own more than 50% of
outstanding target shares when and if the merger is completed. We use the SDC data items labeled as “menumain” and “formc” to
identify those mergers that involve intent to transfer control rights.6
The sample of merging ﬁrms includes nonﬁnancial U.S.-based enterprises. We restrict the sample to U.S. ﬁrms due to data
restrictions on foreign ﬁrms. We restrict the sample to nonﬁnancial ﬁrms because the regulatory environment requires a separate
analysis for ﬁnancial institutions. Finally, because share price information cannot be observed for non-public ﬁrms, at least one of
the two ﬁrms involved in the second stage merger analysis must be publicly traded. The sample of non-merging ﬁrms is compiled
from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT combined database. We apply the same sample selection criteria to the non-merging ﬁrms as we
apply to the merging ﬁrms. That is, the non-merging ﬁrm sample includes only U.S.-based, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms.ever, previous research has found that target shareholders almost always gain from a merger announcement.
SDC merger database starts in January 1977. We need two years of lagged data to construct some variables. Hence, the sample starts in 1979.
“menumain” data item in the SDC database classiﬁes merger transactions into 12 categories: disclosed value, undisclosed value, leveraged buyouts,
offers, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, SP, acquisition of remaining interest, and privatization. Based on SDC
ies, we include only disclosed value, undisclosed value, leverage buyouts, and tender offers in our analysis. Then, the “formc” data item in the SDC
e classiﬁes merger deals into 10 categories: merger, acquisition, acquisition of majority interest, acquisition of partial interest, acquisition of remaining
, acquisition of assets, acquisition of certain assets, recapitalization, buyback, and exchange offer. Based on SDC categories, we include only merger,
ion, and acquisition of majority interest in our analysis.
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1979 through 2004. For the merging and non-merging ﬁrms in the sample, we label a ﬁrm as a bidder, a target, or a non-
merging ﬁrm in that year. That is, based on SDC announcement dates for the merging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm in the CRSP-
COMPUSTAT sample is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given year if it proposes at least one merger bid in the next ﬁnancial
statement release year,7 a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a target ﬁrm if it receives at least one merger bid in the next year, and a ﬁrm is
identiﬁed as a non-merging ﬁrm in a given year if it neither proposes nor receives a merger bid in the next year.8 Using the
ﬁlters and classiﬁcation described above, 2579 ﬁrms propose 6010 bids in 4964 ﬁrm years, 2575 ﬁrms solicit/receive 3043
bids in 2830 ﬁrm years, and 12,856 ﬁrms neither propose nor receive bids in 90,760 ﬁrm quarters. Therefore, the bidder
subsample includes 4964 ﬁrm years, the target subsample includes 2830 ﬁrm years, and the non-merging subsample
includes 90,760 ﬁrm years, for a sample total of 98,554 ﬁrm years.
3. Predicting bidder and target candidacy
In this section, we describe variables used to predict bidder and target candidacy and thus, management's motives for amerger.
As stated above, we include only variables that represent information that is publicly available prior to a merger announcement.
All balance sheet data is taken from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT database for each year over the sample period. To reduce the effect of
outliers, wewindsorize the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.We also verify the accuracy of remaining datawhich appear to
be outliers. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the model. The descriptive statistics for the variables are listed in Appendix A
to the paper.
3.1. Variables that measure management's motives to generate shareholder value
Previous studies have found that a merger may increase shareholder value in four ways: i) by reallocating resources to
withstand economic disturbances (Gort (1969), Mitchell andMulherin (1996), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), and Andrade et al.
(2001)); ii) by achieving economies of scale and scope (Gort (1969), Palepu (1986), Ambrose andMegginson (1992), Moeller et al.
(2004), and Fluck and Lynch (1999)); iii) by gaining access to additional sources of capital that allow the ﬁrm to grow (Fluck and
Lynch (1999), Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Lang et al. (1989), Holmes and Schmitz (1995), Maksimovic and
Phillips (2001), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)); and iv) by exploiting discrepancies in valuation (Gort (1969)).
Mergers may be motivated by management's desire to withstand economic disturbances that may affect ﬁrm sales, proﬁt, and
value. Thus, larger economic disturbances experienced by a ﬁrm could be used to predict bidder and target merger candidacy. We
adopt the Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) sales shock variable as our proxy for economic disturbances. That is, we deﬁne sales shock
as the absolute value of the difference between the two-year median industry9 sales growth rate and the two-year median sales
growth rate for all ﬁrms listed in our sample. To account for convexity in the sales shock variable, we include a second variable, the
square of sales shock.
The desire to reduce costs through economies of scale and scopemight alsomotivate mergers. Twomeasures of scale and scope
are ﬁrm size and ﬁrm sales levels. If economies of scale or scope exist, ﬁrm size, changes in ﬁrm size, and changes in ﬁrm's sales
could predict bidder and target ﬁrmmerger candidacy (Gort (1969), Palepu (1986), Ambrose andMegginson (1992), and Moeller
et al. (2004)). We use the log of total assets as the measure of ﬁrm size. We deﬁne change in size as the percentage change in the
ﬁrm's total assets over the previous two years and sales growth as the percentage change in the ﬁrm's sales over the previous two
years.
Models of economic disturbance and economies of scale and scope both suggest that barriers to entry and exit (due to
economic conditions or size) could be used to predict bidder and target candidacy. Gort (1969) and Eckbo (1992) use a
measure of concentration ratio as a proxy for barriers to entry. Speciﬁcally, Gort hypothesizes that the concentration ratio is
a measure of both large ﬁrm dominance and the extent of barriers to entry. That is, if there is large ﬁrm dominance in an
industry, the ﬁrms in that industry are more likely to engage in mergers. In the case of cross-industry mergers, mergers are a
way for smaller ﬁrms to survive in industries that have large players. In the case of intra-industry mergers, mergers are an
attempt to reduce competition. Accordingly, a high concentration ratio is associated with a higher likelihood of merger.10
We adopt this measure of barriers to entry and deﬁne concentration ratio as the ratio of sales of the largest four ﬁrms to total
industry (using a three-digit SIC) sales.
Mergers may enable ﬁrms to gain access to additional sources of capital (Fluck and Lynch (1999), Palepu (1986), and Ambrose
and Megginson (1992)) and thus, allow well managed ﬁrms to grow (Lang et al. (1989), Holmes and Schmitz (1995), Maksimovic7 A ﬁrm may propose or receive more than one bid in any one year. A ﬁrm that proposes and receives a merger bid in the next year will enter the sample as a
bidder ﬁrm and a target ﬁrm.
8 Some of the non-merging ﬁrms change the release dates of their ﬁnancial statements. As a result, around the change in the release date, these ﬁrms have two
sets of data (one set for the previous ﬁscal year date and one set for the new ﬁscal year date) in the same year. In these cases, we drop the double-counted ﬁrm-
years.
9 Industry ﬁrms include all ﬁrms with the same three-digit SIC code from our sample. If there are fewer than ﬁve ﬁrms in an industry, the two-digit SIC code is
used.
10 Eckbo et al (1990) ﬁnd that bidder returns decrease in industry concentration and in the number of rival ﬁrms in the industry. If concentration is associated
with a higher likelihood, and thus predictability, of a merger, this would explain the decrease in bidder merger returns.
Table 1
Description of variables used to predict bidder and target ﬁrm merger candidacy. This table describes the variables used to predict bidder and target ﬁrm merger
candidacy. The sample covers 26 years from 1979 through 2004. All data come from CRSP-COMPUSTAT database. Based on SDC announcement dates for the
merging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given year if it proposes at least one merger in the next ﬁnancial statement release year, a ﬁrm is
identiﬁed as a target ﬁrm if it receives at least one merger bid in the next year, and a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a non-merging ﬁrm if it neither proposes nor receives a
merger bid in the next year.
Variable Deﬁnition
Sales shock The absolute value of the difference between the two-year median industry sales growth and the
two-year median sales growth for all ﬁrms in the sample.
Sales shock squared Square of sales shock
Size The log of total assets.
Change in size The percentage change in the book value of assets of the ﬁrm in the last two years.
Sales growth The change in the ﬁrm's net sales in the last two years.
Concentration ratio The ratio of sales of the largest four ﬁrms (in terms of sales) to total industry sales.
Resource-growth-mismatch A dummy variable equal to one if i) sales growth for a ﬁrm in the last two years is less
than the industry median and long-term debt ratio is greater than the industry median, or ii) if sales
growth in the last two years is greater than the industry median and long-term debt ratio is less than
the industry median, and zero otherwise.
Return on assets (ROA) The ratio of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring) items to total assets.
Share turnover Ratio of the number of shares of stock traded for the ﬁrm to the total shares outstanding.
Cash ratio Ratio of cash to total assets.
Previous mergers Counts the number of times a ﬁrm proposes or receives a merger bid in the prior two years.
Dormant period The number of months since the last merger in the industry (industry is deﬁned at the 3-digit SIC level).
Price run-up Percentage change in a ﬁrm's stock price in the prior two years.
Information asymmetry Dummy variable equal to one if the market-to-book ratio is higher than the industry median and share
turnover is lower than to the industry median and zero otherwise.
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deﬁne resource-growth-mismatch as a dummy variable equal to one if i) sales growth for a ﬁrm in the last two years is less than the
industry median and the long-term debt ratio (ratio of book value of long-term debt to total assets) is greater than the industry
median, or ii) if sales growth in the last two years is greater than the industry median and the long-term debt ratio is less than the
industry median, and zero otherwise. The measure represents management motives to access new sources of capital. That is, this
variable identiﬁes ﬁrms with either growth opportunities but insufﬁcient capital access, or with insufﬁcient growth opportunities
but capital access. Thus, larger resource-growth-mismatch experienced by a ﬁrm could be used to predict merger candidacy.
Further, bidder ﬁrms with superior management that acquire poorlymanaged target ﬁrms (and their underutilized capital) are
more likely to employ post-merger assets more efﬁciently. A gauge of a well managed ﬁrm is proﬁtability, which we measure as
return on assets (ROA). ROA is calculated as the ratio of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring) items to total assets. A
larger ROA for a ﬁrm may predict merger candidacy.
Gort (1969) predicts that discrepancies in valuationmay prompt mergers. Gort measures discrepancies in ﬁrm valuation using
low share turnover.We followGort and use share turnover as a proxymeasure for discrepencies in opinion. Speciﬁcally, high share
turnover, meaning more purchases, would indicate higher discrepencies in opinion. Following Gort, we expect that the higher a
ﬁrm's share turnover, themore likely it is that the ﬁrm proposes and/or receives amerger bid.We deﬁne share turnover as the ratio
of the number of shares of stock traded for the ﬁrm to the total shares outstanding and use this measure as a proxy for
discrepancies in valuation.
3.2. Variables that measure management's motives to generate opportunistic beneﬁts
Harford (1999) shows that ﬁrms with excess cash are more likely to make acquisitions and their acquisitions are more likely to
be value decreasing. Harford et al. (2008) also ﬁnd that entrenchedmanagers primarily spend their cash on acquisitions. Hence, to
exploit opportunistic beneﬁts, ﬁrms with large cash reserves would be more likely to propose a merger and less likely to receive a
merger bid. We deﬁne cash ratio as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.
In the pursuit of opportunistic beneﬁts, we also explore the possibility that ﬁrm managers may be motivated to propose
multiple mergers to build empires. Indeed, research has found that individual ﬁrms with a history of mergers are more likely to
propose and receive additional merger bids (Schipper and Thompson (1983), Malatesta and Thomson (1985), Asquith et al.
(1983), Loderer and Martin (1990), Holmes and Schmit (1995), Fuller et al. (2002), and Ismail (2005)). However, Aktas et al.
(2009) ﬁnd that rather than hubris, CEOs of frequent acquirers are on a learning curve: they often start with small, lower-risk deals
and build capabilities in deal making. As acquirer CEOs are learning, they improve their target selection and integration processing
abilities from deal to deal. This learning process has consequences for the bidding such that abnormal returns decrease from deal
to deal. Accordingly, we track the merger record of the bidder ﬁrms to construct a variable, previous mergers, that counts the
number of times a ﬁrm proposes or receives a merger bid in the prior two years. A higher value for previous mergers could be used
to predict bidder candidacy as each additional bid may be part of an overall acquisition program. Similarly, prior literature has
documented that many acquirers are subsequently taken over themselves, especially those that engaged in value destroying
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already received a merger bid are more likely to look for a subsequent bid. Thus, for target ﬁrms we also track previous mergers in
the prior two years. A higher value for previous bids could be used to predict target candidacy.
Song and Walkling (2000, 2008) ﬁnd evidence of anticipation and transfer of information throughout an industry at the
announcement of initial bidding activity. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that abnormal returns of bidding ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly positively
related to the length of time between bid announcements in an industry. Further, at the time of an industry's initial announcement,
rivals thatwill bid in the future experience signiﬁcantprice adjustments in comparison tonon-bidding rivals. Thus,ﬁrmmanagersmay
bemotivated tomerge simply to partake in themergerwave andnot necessarily to build shareholder value.We deﬁne dormant period
as the number of months since the last merger in the industry. We again deﬁne industry by using the three-digit SIC code as listed in
the CRSP-COMPUSTAT database.We calculate dormant period for every industry in ourmergingﬁrm sample. A low value for dormant
periodwould indicate greater merger intensity in the industry and may be used to predict merger candidacy.
3.3. Variables that measure management's motives to generate shareholder value and generate opportunistic beneﬁts
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that mispricing in share prices may alter investment decisions of the mispriced ﬁrm's
management. Managers, as decision makers, have private information about the ﬁrm. Indeed, Eckbo et al. (1990) ﬁnd that
managers of bidders, but not targets, have valuable private information about the potential synergies from proposedmergers. Two
opposing views investigate whether managers utilize their information advantage to serve shareholders or to protect
opportunistic beneﬁts. On the one hand, managers, who believe their stock is overvalued, may try to generate long run value
for pre-merger shareholders at the expense of post-merger shareholders (Hansen (1987), Schwert (1996), and Betton et al.
(2009)). Uncertainty about private values enables managers to hide their true goals. Information asymmetry models (such as
Rhoades-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)) ﬁnd that for a target ﬁrm's management to agree to a merger bid proposed by an
overvalued bidder, they must be fooled into thinking that the bidder ﬁrm is less overvalued than it is. On the other hand,
overvaluation may intensify incentive conﬂicts between the ﬁrm's managers and shareholders. That is, managers may be tempted
to destroy shareholder value using mergers ﬁnanced with overvalued equity in an attempt to protect opportunistic beneﬁts at the
expense of both pre- and post-merger shareholders (Jensen (2005)).
We use two variables, price run-up and information asymmetry, to measure management's motives to exploit its information
advantage when markets misprice the value of a ﬁrm. We deﬁne price run-up as the change in a ﬁrm's stock price in the two years
prior to a given quarter. Stock price data are taken from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT database. Information asymmetry is a dummy
variable that measures both overvaluation and opaqueness in share prices. This variable takes a value one if a ﬁrm's stock price is
overvalued (measured as a market-to-book value [equals (the closing price of the ﬁrm's common stock×the number of common
shares outstanding)/ the book value of stockholder's equity at the end of each year as listed in CRSP-COMPUSTAT database] that is
greater than the industry median) and opaque (the ﬁrm's share turnover (as deﬁned above) is lower than its industry median),
and zero otherwise. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) ﬁnd that overvalued and opaque ﬁrms aremore likely to makemerger
bids to exploit the overvaluation in their shares. High price run-up and high information asymmetry provides bidder ﬁrm
management with an environment that allows for this.
3.4. Results of merger candidacy models
We run 26 multinomial logit regressions (one for each year from 1979 through 2004) on the proxies for merger motives to
estimate investor anticipations about bidder candidacy (Eq. 1). Based on SDC announcement dates for the merging ﬁrm sample, a
ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given year if it proposes at least onemerger bid in the next ﬁnancial statement release year, a
ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a target ﬁrm if it receives at least onemerger bid in the next year, and a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a non-merging ﬁrm
if it neither proposes nor receives a merger bid in the next year. Thus, the indicator is set equal to 0 if the ﬁrm proposes a bid in the
next year, to 1 if the ﬁrm receives a bid in the next year, and to 2 if it neither proposes nor receives a bid. Thus, following Eq. (1), we
run the following:11 Hie
synergiMj = ðsales schockÞj × γðsales shockÞj + ðsquare of sales shockÞj × γ
ðsquare of sales schockÞ
j + ðsizeÞj × γ
ðsizeÞ
j
+ ðchange in sizeÞj × γðchange in sizeÞj + ðsales growthÞj × γ
ðsales growthÞ
j + ðconcentration ratioÞj × γ
ðconcentration ratioÞ
j
+ ðresource‐growth‐mismatchÞj × γðresource growth‐mismatchÞj + ðROAÞj × γ
ðROAÞ
j + ðshare turnoverÞj × γ
ðshare turnoverÞ
j
+ ðcash ratioÞj × γðcash ratioÞj + ðprevious bidsÞj × γ
ðprevious bidsÞ
j + ðdormant periodÞj × γ
ðdormant periodÞ
j
+ ðprice run‐upÞj × γðprice run‐upÞj + ðinformation asymmetryÞj × γ
ðinformation asymmetryÞ
j + εj
for j = bidder; target;non‐merging firms
ð6Þtala et al. (2003) ﬁnd that in only two types of cases is it theoretically possible to use stock price movements to infer bidder overpayment and relative
es. Even in these two cases they ﬁnd it is practically difﬁcult to extract this information.
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and 75th percentile values of the marginal coefﬁcient estimates for bidder and target ﬁrms, respectively. Marginal
probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous variables and at zero for the information asymmetry and
resource-growth-mismatch dummy variables. The estimates are the derivatives of the probability to propose and receive a
merger bid with respect to a particular exogenous variable. Panel C reports the goodness-of-ﬁt diagnostics. The last column
in Table 2 reports the t-statistic for the test of the null hypothesis of no predictability in bidder and target merger
candidacy, which would be conﬁrmed only if all regression slopes differ insigniﬁcantly from zero.
Table 2 indicates that a mix of motives prompts management to propose and receive merger bids. From Panel A of Table 2,
variables that represent bidder management's motives to generate shareholder value (large asset size (t=9.39), high asset
growth (t=1.99), high concentration ratio (t=2.85), high ROA (t=3.63), and high share turnover (t=8.71)), to generate
opportunistic beneﬁts (high previous mergers (t=9.99) and short dormant period (t=−3.81), and to do both (high price run-up
(t=5.63)) predict bidder candidacy. From Panel B of Table 2, proxies that represent target ﬁrmmanagement's motives to generate
shareholder value (high sales shock (t=1.95), high ROA (t=3.52), high share turnover (t=6.64), small asset size (t=−2.98),
low asset and sales growth (t=−3.43 and −2.73, respectively), to generate opportunistic beneﬁts (low cash ratio (t=−2.04)
and short dormant period (t=−4.18)), and to do both (low price run-up (t=−2.53) and low information asymmetry (t=
−3.65)) predict target candidacy.12 Results indicate that markets can predict bidder and target candidacy.
Table 3 further investigates the predictive power of the bidder and target candidacy models. Panels A and B report summary
statistics on the probability to propose and receive a bid, respectively, in the bidder, target, and non-merging ﬁrms subsamples as
estimated by the candidacy model. Panel C reports summary statistics on the X2 statistic of the likelihood-ratio test and pseudo R2.
In our sample, the fraction of bidder-years is 5.04% (4964 of the sample total 98,554 ﬁrm years) and the fraction of target-years is
2.87% (2830 of the sample total). Panel A in Table 3 reports that the average probability of proposing a bid is 12.12% for bidders,
6.78% for targets, and 4.60% for non-merging ﬁrms. The average probability of receiving a bid is 4.50% for targets, 3.94 for bidders,
and 2.76% for non-merging ﬁrms, respectively. Thus, the candidacy models correctly estimate that bidders are more likely to
propose bids than nonbidders and that targets are more likely to receive bids than nontargets. Investors do not do as good a job in
predicting target candidates as they do in predicting bidder candidates. Panel C of Table 3 reports the average R2 in the cross-
sectional regressions as 8.10%. The null hypothesis that the model has no explanatory power is rejected in all 26 regressions.
The overall ﬁt of the logit models is modest but similar to the previous literature (e.g., Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and
Cremers et al. (2009)). For example, Cremers et al.'s logit models produce pseudo R2 values of 3.13% and 9.27% for their samples of
completed takeovers.
4. Stock market responses to merger announcements
Next we examine whether predictability in merger candidacy affects stock price responses to merger announcements.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate different speciﬁcations of regression Eqs. (4) (for bidder ﬁrms) and (5) (for target ﬁrms). In all
speciﬁcations, the dependent variable is the 3-day CAR.13 Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between observed and
“normal” returns. We use the market-model to estimate “normal returns” for the merging ﬁrms.14 In these regressions, we control
for information that is released at the merger announcement such as features of the contract (e.g., all equity, deal value, and
relative size), the economic ﬁt betweenmerger partners (e.g., same industry and same state), and the relative bargaining power of
the merger partners (e.g., anti-takeover defense, unwelcoming attitude, and target bankrupt). These data are collected from the
SDC database. The variables are discussed below and are summarized in Table 4. To reduce the effect of outliers (very large bidders
or targets), we windsorize the observations at the 1st and 99th percentiles based on the relative value variable. Descriptive
statistics for these regression variables are reported Appendix B to the paper. Table 5 reports regression results for bidder ﬁrms and
Table 6 reports results for target ﬁrms. The regressions differ in the combination of control variables included. In 212 of the deals,
there is at least one more merger announcement by either the bidder or the target on the same date. We exclude these deals from
the sample since it is not possible to uniquely attribute the abnormal returns observed around the announcement to a speciﬁc deal.
Finally, the sample of merger deals analyzed includes 5740 proposed bids and 2963 solicited/received bids.
4.1. Regressions of bidder cumulative abnormal returns
Table 5 reports regression results of the 3-day CAR for bidder ﬁrms at a merger announcement. The ﬁrst four regressions
include the surprise instrument and variables that control for the method of ﬁnancing the merger, that proxy for the economic ﬁt,
and that examine bargaining power of bidders versus targets involved in the merger. The ﬁfth regression includes all explanatory
variables except the surprise instrument so as to benchmark the results against a single-equation model.12 The results are consistent in sign and magnitude with those of previous studies, e.g., Moeller et al. (2004) for asset size and asset growth, Asquith et al. (1983)
and many others for ROA, Song and Walkling (2000, 2008) for previous mergers and dormant period, and Asquith et al. (1983) for price run-up.
13 We also examine alternative event-windows such as 7-day, 11-day, and 15-day to calculate abnormal returns. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
14 Market-model estimation starts 256 days prior to the merger announcement and ends 30 days prior to the announcement. We require that each ﬁrm have at
least 30 observations for the market-model estimation. We use EVENTUS to calculate cumulative abnormal returns by summing daily abnormal returns over the
three-day event window. We use the equally-weighted CRSP index as the market proxy. We also examine alternative models that use the value-weighted CRSP
index as the market proxy. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Table 2
Multinomial logit regressions of bidder and target candidacy. This table reports results of 26 cross-sectional multinomial logit regressions. Based on SDC
announcement dates for the merging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given year if it proposes at least one merger in the next ﬁnancial
statement release year, as a target ﬁrm in a given year if it receives at least one bid in the next year, as a non-merging ﬁrm if it neither proposes nor receives a bid in
the next year. The indicator is set equal to 0 if the ﬁrm proposes a bid in the next year, to 1 if it receives a bid and 2 otherwise. Panels A and B report the mean,
standard deviation, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values of the marginal coefﬁcient estimates for bidder and target candidacy, respectively. Marginal
probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous variables and at zero for the high information asymmetry and resource-growth-mismatch
indicator variables. Last column in Panel A and B reports the t-statistic for the test of the null hypothesis that the mean of the coefﬁcient is equal to 0. Panel C
reports pseudo R2. Marginal probability estimates and pseudo R2 are in percent.
Mean Standard Deviation 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile t-statistic
Panel A — summary statistics for marginal-probability estimates, bidder ﬁrms
Sales shock 0.20 5.38 −2.54 0.87 2.86 0.19
Sales shock squared −0.23 13.35 −4.05 −0.75 2.21 −0.09
Size 0.50 0.27 0.31 0.46 0.69 9.39
Change in size 0.14 0.35 −0.02 0.02 0.31 1.99
Sales growth 0.02 0.32 −0.05 0.07 0.18 0.24
Concentration ratio 1.24 2.22 −0.31 0.82 1.98 2.85
Resource-growth-mismatch −0.11 0.43 −0.22 0.01 0.16 −1.29
ROA 3.83 5.39 0.76 2.11 4.19 3.63
Share turnover 0.67 0.39 0.53 0.71 0.94 8.71
Cash ratio 0.90 6.06 0.92 2.41 3.63 0.76
Previous mergers 2.37 1.21 1.62 2.18 3.30 9.99
Dormant period −0.03 0.04 −0.05 −0.02 0.00 −3.81
Price run-up 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.28 0.48 5.63
Information asymmetry −0.07 0.85 −0.45 −0.04 0.58 −0.44
Panel B — summary statistics for marginal-probability estimates, target ﬁrms
Sales shock 1.93 5.05 −1.72 1.26 5.80 1.95
Sales shock squared −4.77 15.98 −8.01 −1.31 2.76 −1.52
Size −0.11 0.19 −0.20 −0.10 0.00 −2.98
Change in size −0.31 0.46 −0.74 −0.26 0.09 −3.43
Sales growth −0.29 0.54 −0.39 −0.11 0.02 −2.73
Concentration ratio 0.15 1.68 −0.25 0.15 1.15 0.46
Resource-growth-mismatch 0.08 0.52 −0.26 −0.02 0.30 0.82
ROA 1.38 2.00 0.12 0.57 1.87 3.52
Share turnover 0.86 0.66 0.38 0.60 1.24 6.64
Cash ratio −1.69 4.23 −4.41 −1.55 1.19 −2.04
Previous mergers −1.05 11.69 0.82 1.07 2.07 −0.46
Dormant period −0.06 0.07 −0.08 −0.04 −0.01 −4.18
Price run-up −0.15 0.30 −0.41 −0.14 0.10 −2.53
Information asymmetry −0.55 0.77 −1.00 −0.47 −0.04 −3.65
Panel C — goodness-of-ﬁt diagnostics
Pseudo R2 8.10 2.05 7.29 7.62 8.53
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announcements. The greater the surprise in a merger announcement, the greater is the information revealed about unanticipated
merger motives and the larger is the surprise instrument. Hence, the surprise instrument is intuitively a measure of the extent toTable 3
Goodness-of-ﬁt diagnostics for models of candidacy. Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile, and maximum values of
the probability to propose a bid in the bidder, target and non-merging ﬁrms subsamples as estimated by the candidacy model. Panel B reports the mean, standard
deviation, minimum, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile, and maximum values of the probability to receive a bid in the bidder, target and non-merging ﬁrms subsamples
as estimated by the candidacy model. Panel C reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile, andmaximum values for the X2 statistic
of the likelihood-ratio test and pseudo R2. Predicted probabilities and Pseudo R2 are in percent.
Mean Standard deviation Minimum 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile Maximum N
Panel A — distribution of probability of bidding by bidder, target, and non-merging ﬁrms
Bidder ﬁrms 12.12 14.12 0.08 4.37 7.34 13.31 99.95 4964
Target ﬁrms 6.78 8.27 0.00 2.79 4.53 7.65 92.86 2830
Non-merger ﬁrms 4.60 4.95 0.00 1.96 3.47 5.66 98.79 90,760
Panel B — distribution of probability of receiving bids by bidder, target, and non-merging ﬁrms
Bidder ﬁrms 3.94 3.00 0.00 2.02 3.28 5.03 51.31 4964
Target ﬁrms 4.50 3.40 0.11 2.63 3.77 5.48 54.29 2830
Non-merger ﬁrms 2.76 2.05 0.00 1.36 2.40 3.71 46.15 90,760
Panel C — goodness-of-ﬁt diagnostics
Pseudo R2 8.10 2.05 4.54 7.29 7.62 8.53 16.15 26
X2 statistic 185.84 85.79 62.18 124.66 159.13 235.26 356.84 26
Table 4
Description of variables used to explain merger announcement cumulative abnormal returns. This table describes the variables used to examine whether
predictability in merger candidacy affects stock price responses to merger announcements. The sample covers 26 years from 1979 through 2004. The variables are
compiled using the SDC database. Based on SDC announcement dates for the merging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given quarter if it
proposes at least onemerger in the next ﬁnancial statement release year and a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a target ﬁrm if it receives at least onemerger bid in the next year.
Variable Deﬁnition
All-equity indicator Dummy variable equal to one if the merger is ﬁnanced only with equity of the bidder ﬁrm and zero otherwise.
Deal value The announced value of merger, in billions of dollars.
Relative value The ratio of the value of the merger to the market value of the bidder's (target's) common stock at the quarter end
prior to the merger announcement.
Same industry Dummy variable equal to one if the merging ﬁrms are in the same industry, and zero otherwise.
Same state Dummy variable equal to one if the main operations of bidder and target ﬁrms are in the same state,
and zero otherwise.
Anti-takeover defense Dummy variable equal to one if the target employs anti-takeover defenses to discourage a takeover attempt,
and zero otherwise.
Unwelcoming attitude Dummy variable equal to one if the target ﬁrm management's initial recommendation is negative or the target ﬁrm
did not solicit the bid, and zero otherwise.
Target bankrupt Dummy variable equal to one if the target ﬁrm is in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of the merger announcement,
and zero otherwise.
Bidder/target status Dummy variable equal to one if the counterparty (target for bidders and bidder for targets) is a private ﬁrm at the
time of the merger announcement and zero otherwise.
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one when CAR is positive and zero when CAR is negative.We then interact this variable with the surprise instrument in bidder and
target regressions. Thus, the coefﬁcient on the surprise instrument measures the surprise reaction to negative CAR deals. The
coefﬁcient for the surprise instrument for positive deals is equal to coefﬁcient of the surprise instrument plus the coefﬁcient of the
interaction variable.
The coefﬁcients on the surprise instrument are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all regressions in Table 5 (t-statistics
range from 4.44 to 5.40). Further, the coefﬁcients on the interaction are positive and highly signiﬁcant (t-statistics range from
15.17 to 16.70). The coefﬁcients on the surprise instrument for positive deals (the sum of the two coefﬁcients) turn out to be
positive and signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding strongly supports the hypothesis that the magnitude of the CARs is affected by whether the
merger announcement is a surprise or not. For negative CAR deals, the surprise is a bad surprise and as the surprise instrument
increases (i.e., the surprise increases), CAR decreases and becomes even more negative (the coefﬁcient is negative). For positive
CAR deals, the surprise is a good surprise and as the surprise instrument increases (i.e., the surprise increases), CAR increases and
becomes even more positive (the sum of coefﬁcient and interaction is positive). Thus, the more surprised the market is about a
merger deal, the greater is the impact of the announcement on bidder stock prices.
The all-equity dummy variable identiﬁes the method of payment used in a merger. We set this variable equal to one if the
merger is ﬁnanced only with equity of the bidder ﬁrm and zero otherwise. Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking-order hypothesis
states that markets assess a ﬁrm as overvalued when equity is used to ﬁnance investment projects. Accordingly, we expect and
ﬁnd that all-equity ﬁnanced mergers result in lower abnormal returns to bidder shareholders.15
Asquith et al. (1983) document that the larger the size of a target ﬁrm relative to the bidder ﬁrm in a merger, the greater
are bidder and target cumulative returns at a merger announcement. Further, Moeller et al. (2005) ﬁnd that mergers whose
values exceed $1 billion erode bidder shareholder value by $7.38 per $100 invested. Accordingly, we use two variables, deal
value and relative size, to represent the absolute and relative size of the mergers. We deﬁne deal value as the announced
value of a merger in billions of dollars and relative size as the ratio of the deal value to the market value of a bidder's (or
target in Table 6) common stock at the year-end prior to a merger announcement.16 For bidder ﬁrms, the coefﬁcient on deal
value is negative and signiﬁcant in all regressions. As in Moeller et al., the larger the absolute size of the deal, the greater is
the erosion in bidder shareholder value at a merger announcement. Conﬁrming Asquith et al., the larger the deal value
relative to bidder size, the greater the positive impact of the announcement: the coefﬁcients on relative size are positive but
signiﬁcant in only one of the three regressions.
Economic ﬁt between bidder and target ﬁrms determines how much total shareholder value a merger might generate.
Two variables are examined: whether merging ﬁrms operate in the same industry and whether they are located in the
same state. Same industry is a dummy variable equal to one if the merging ﬁrms are in the same industry (using three-
digit SIC codes) and zero otherwise. Similar to Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004), this variable measures the
extent to which the merger is focus-increasing and focus- decreasing (or diversifying) and, therefore, the extent to which
assets-in-place of the stand alone ﬁrms complement and/or substitute for each other. Geographic proximity may affect15 The method of ﬁnancing the merger is taken from the SDC database.
16 Deal values are from the SDC database. Market value of common stock is the number of shares of common stock outstanding times the closing price of
common stock and is taken from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT database.
Table 5
Regressions of bidder CARs. This table reports results of regressions examining whether predictability in merger candidacy affects bidder stock price responses to
merger announcements. Based on SDC announcement dates for the merging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given year if it proposes at least
one merger in the next ﬁnancial statement release year. The dependent variable is the 3-day bidder cumulative abnormal returns. t-statistics based on the Huber/
White/Sandwich estimator of variance are reported in brackets. Coefﬁcient estimates and R2 are in percent.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Surprise instrument −1.93 −1.94 −1.69 −1.70
[5.35] a [5.40] a [4.44] a [4.46] a
Surprise instrument interaction 6.05 6.06 6.08 6.09
[15.17] a [15.18] a [16.70] a [16.70] a
All-equity indicator −0.95 −0.96 −0.57 −0.59 −1.18
[2.96] a [2.95] a [1.86] c [1.89] c [3.32] a
Deal value −0.17 −0.16 −0.23
[4.81] a [4.75] a [4.48] a
Relative size 0.14 0.14 0.81
[0.32] [0.32] [1.70] c
Same industry −0.53 −0.24 −0.05
[2.24] b [0.90] [0.17]
Same state 0.81 0.48 0.42
[2.15] b [1.62] [1.22]
Anti-takeover defense −1.23 −1.20 −0.66
[1.22] [1.19] [0.55]
Unwelcoming attitude 0.83 −0.85 −0.14
[1.78] c [1.81] c [0.23]
Target bankrupt 1.05 1.12 2.80
[0.79] [0.84] [1.40]
Target status 1.30 1.29 2.15
[5.34] a [5.30] a [7.28] a
Constant −4.44 −4.62 −5.47 −5.60 −2.19
[2.06] b [2.14] b [2.19] b [2.24] b [0.84]
Observations 4789 4789 3481 3481 3481
Adjusted-R2 22.18 22.34 30.11 30.15 3.99
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 10%.
c Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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cultures, which in turn may affect the total shareholder value that a merger generates (Chakrabarti (2005)). Second, local
deals may work to the advantage of bidder shareholders because proximity may mean that bidder management has
superior information about the target than it would if the target ﬁrm was located further away (Kedia et al. (2005)).
We deﬁne same state as a dummy variable equal to one if the main operations of bidder and target ﬁrms are in the same
state and zero otherwise. Table 5 reports that the coefﬁcients on these variables are signiﬁcant (at 5%) in explaining
bidder CARs in Regression 2 and are insigniﬁcant in the other regressions. Thus, economic ﬁt does appear to have a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on bidder returns.
At a merger announcement, once the merger partners are known, the relative bargaining power of bidder and target
ﬁrms is revealed. Relative bargaining power determines how the total value associated with a merger is shared between
bidder and target ﬁrm shareholders. We use four variables to measure the relative bargaining power of bidders and targets:
whether the target employs anti-takeover defenses (e.g., poison pills, lock-ups, greenmail, and white knights) to discourage
a takeover attempt, whether the target management initially resists the merger, whether the target is in bankruptcy
proceedings, and whether the counterparty is a private ﬁrm or not. Anti-takeover defenses strengthen target management's
ability to resist takeovers and to increase the bargaining power of target management (Ambrose and Megginson (1992)).
Further, when the target CEO gives an initial negative recommendation about the merger to the target ﬁrm's board the
bargaining power of the target is strengthened since the bidder would likely have to increase its bid to overcome the initial
resistance (Jennings and Mazzeo (1993)). Target bargaining power varies inversely with the need of target shareholders to
sell the ﬁrm. The extreme case is shareholders of bankrupt (target) ﬁrms that are in dire need of help. Thus, bankruptcy
proceedings would weaken the target's bargaining power. Anti-takeover defenses, unwelcoming attitude, and target bankrupt
are dummy variables that control for the presence of anti-takeover defenses, for differences in the reception of merger
proposals, and for the need to sell when in bankruptcy, respectively.17 Table 4 reports that none of these variables is
consistently signiﬁcant in explaining bidder announcement period CARs.17 Information on these variables was obtained from the SDC database.
Table 6
Regressions of target CARs. This table reports results of regressions examining whether predictability in merger candidacy affects target stock price responses to
merger announcements. Based on SDC announcement dates for themerging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a target ﬁrm in a given year if it receives at least one
merger bid in the next ﬁnancial statement release year. The dependent variable is the 3-day target cumulative abnormal returns. t-statistics based on the Huber/
White/Sandwich estimator of variance are reported in brackets. Coefﬁcient estimates and R2 are in percent.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Surprise instrument −10.08 −10.08 −9.25 −9.26
[11.51]a [11.50]a [10.48]a [10.47]a
Surprise instrument interaction 11.00 11.00 10.13 10.14
[14.54]a [14.55]a [12.78]a [12.77]a
All-equity indicator −4.82 −4.73 −4.97 −4.89 −6.27
[4.29]a [4.25]a [4.33]a [4.28]a [5.11]a
Deal value −0.10 −0.11 −0.10
[1.49] [1.51] [1.29]
Relative size 4.75 4.74 5.59
[6.14]a [6.12]a [6.86]a
Same industry 0.51 0.19 −0.26
[0.48] [0.18] [0.23]
Same state −1.34 −1.12 −1.08
[1.24] [1.10] [0.98]
Anti-takeover defense 4.95 4.89 5.34
[1.53] [1.51] [1.64]
Unwelcoming attitude −0.67 −0.67 −0.72 1.25
[0.47] [0.51] [0.84]
Target bankrupt 15.59 15.50 18.63
[1.14] [1.14] [1.34]
Bidder status −4.34 −4.26 −4.69
[2.79]a [2.75]a [2.77]a
Constant 11.41 11.70 9.99 10.36 12.70
[1.47] [1.52] [0.80] [0.84] [1.14]
Observations 4789 4789 3481 3481 3481
Adjusted-R2 18.17 18.16 21.62 21.58 10.64
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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ﬁrms in a merger and thus, the stock price responses to a merger announcement. Speciﬁcally, ownership structures of bidder
and target ﬁrms affect the liquidity of shares and access to capital markets. Thus, public bidders (or targets) secure more
value for their shareholders because their bargaining power relative to private ﬁrms is higher. Indeed, Bradley and Sundaram
(2006) ﬁnd that bidder returns are lower when the target is a public ﬁrm. We deﬁne bidder (target) status as a dummy
variable equal to one if the target (bidder in Table 6) ﬁrm is a private ﬁrm and zero otherwise. From Table 5, we see that
target status is positive and signiﬁcant in explaining bidder CARs, i.e., if the target is a private ﬁrm, bidder CARs are
signiﬁcantly higher. Thus, the results indicate that private ﬁrms may have lower bargaining power in negotiating merger
deals.
The last regression in Table 5 benchmarks the results of a single-equation model by including all regressors except for the
surprise instruments. Comparing regressions 4 (with surprise instruments) and 5 (without surprise instruments), the adjusted-R2
in regression 5 (3.99) is much smaller than that in regression 4 (30.15). This ﬁnding supports the hypothesis that anticipations
about bidder candidacy contribute to our understanding of stock price responses to merger announcements. A single-equation
model is not as powerful in explaining stock price responses as the two-stage model.4.2. Regressions of target cumulative abnormal returns
Table 6 reports regression results of the 3-day CAR for target ﬁrms at the merger announcement. The setup for Table 6 (for
target ﬁrms) is identical to that for Table 5 (for bidder ﬁrms). The results for the control variables in Table 6 are similar to those in
Table 5 for bidders with three exceptions: i) relative size is positive and signiﬁcant, ii) deal value is insigniﬁcant for target ﬁrms,
and iii) if the bidder is private, target CARs are signiﬁcantly lower.
More importantly, in all regressions in Table 6, the coefﬁcients on the surprise instrument are negative and statistically
signiﬁcant, while the coefﬁcients on the interaction term are positive and highly signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients on the surprise
instrument for positive deals (the sum of the two coefﬁcients) are positive and signiﬁcant. Thus, as we ﬁnd for the bidders, the
magnitude of the target CARs is affected by whether the merger announcement is a surprise or not. For negative CAR deals, the
surprise is a bad surprise and as the surprise instrument increases (i.e., the surprise increases), CAR decreases and becomes even
more negative. For positive CAR deals, the surprise is a good surprise and as the surprise instrument increases (i.e., the surprise
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market is about a merger deal, the greater is the impact of the announcement on target stock prices.
4.3. Investor anticipations of merger candidacy and CARs
A crucial assumption in merger announcement event studies is that investors learn merger-related information in a
short window of time. However, we ﬁnd that there is anticipation of bidder candidacy. As a result, some merger-related
information is stale at the time of announcements. Further, we ﬁnd that there is less anticipation of target candidacy.
Thus, the information that merger announcements reveal about targets is less stale. As a consequence of the difference in
the freshness of information revealed at a merger announcement, it is not surprising that previous research has found
that target ﬁrm CARs are larger in magnitude than bidder CARs. Without controlling for differences in predictability of
merger candidacy, it is incorrect to conclude that target shareholders capture the majority of the value gains that mergers
generate.
Our ﬁndings indicate that, at least to some extent, the asymmetry in investor anticipations about bidder and target candidacy
drives the disparity in bidder and target announcement period abnormal returns. To further investigate the disparity between
bidder and target CARs, we classify bidder and target ﬁrms into 7 categories according to the predicted probability of proposing
and receiving a merger bid, obtained from regression Eq. (6). For example, CARs for bidder ﬁrms with a 0–3% predicted probability
of proposing amerger are compared against CARs for target ﬁrmswith a 0–3% predicted probability of receiving amerger proposal.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7.
From Table 7, we see that bidder ﬁrm CARs decrease as the predicted probability of proposing a merger bid increases. For
example, the CAR for bidder ﬁrms with a predicted probability of proposing a merger between 0 and 3% is 3.82%, while for bidders
with a predicted probability greater than 25% is –0.36%. The difference is signiﬁcant at 1%. The decrease in target CARs as the
predicted probability of receiving bids increases is not as smooth, but is nevertheless decreasing. The CAR for target ﬁrms with a
predicted probability of proposing amerger between 0 and 3% is 19.64%, while for targets with a predicted probability greater than
25% is 10.99%. The difference is signiﬁcant at 1%.
To see the importance of predictability, we can look at the deals in which the identity of both the bidder and target are
a surprise. The difference in CARs for bidder and target ﬁrms with a predicted probability of proposing and soliciting a
merger between 0 and 3% is 15.82%, while the sample average is 18.78%. The difference is signiﬁcant at 1%. Thus, when
both the bidder and target is unanticipated, the difference in CARs is signiﬁcantly smaller than when either party is
anticipated as a merger candidate. Further, the market has not impounded the affects of the merger in both the bidder's
and target's price. The average probability to propose and receive a bid in the sample is 14.34 and 4.55%, respectively. The
average CAR for bidders with predicted probabilities between 14 and 25% is 0.02% and the average CAR for targets with
predicted probabilities between 4 and 6% is 19.70%. The mean difference is 19.68%, signiﬁcant at 1%. Thus, when the bidder
is anticipated and the target is not, the difference in CARs is large. The market has already impounded affects of the merger
in the bidder's price. But the merger is less anticipated for the target, so the market reaction is larger. However, when both
bidder and target ﬁrms are equally unanticipated as merger candidates, the difference in CARs is smaller. Panel B of Table 7
shows that when we control for investor anticipations in merger announcements, the difference in CARs is reduced by
1.90% (18.78–16.88). The difference is signiﬁcant at 1%. Thus, the evidence supports our hypothesis that to some extent the
asymmetry in investor anticipations of merger parties causes disparity in bidder and target ﬁrm announcement period
abnormal returns.Table 7
The merger announcement CARs for equally-anticipated bidders and targets. This table classiﬁes bidder and target ﬁrms into 7 categories according to the
predicted probability of proposing and receiving bids. Panel A reports bidder and target 3-day CARs, differences in bidder and target ﬁrm 3-day CARs, and the
number of bidders and targets in each category. Panel B reports the average difference CARs across the 7 categories. The ﬁrst row in Panel B reports the averages for
the 7 categories, the average of differences in the 7 categories, and the number of bidders and targets. The second row in Panel B reports the CARs across all deals,
the difference in CARs across all deals, and the number of bidders and targets.
Predicted probabilities Mean bidder CARs (%) Mean target CARs (%) Difference in mean CARs (%) Number of bidders Number of targets
Panel A — Comparison of CARs for equally-anticipated bidders and targets
0–3% 3.82 19.64 15.82 400 795
3–4% 1.54 19.73 18.20 513 655
4–6% 0.57 19.70 19.13 768 579
6–9% 0.64 18.47 17.83 970 323
9–14% −0.11 18.43 18.54 718 83
14%–25% 0.02 17.34 17.32 726 38
Over 25% −0.36 10.99 11.35 694 9
Panel B — Difference in bidder and target CARs averaged across all categories and all deals
Average of 10 categories 0.87 17.76 16.88 4789 2482
All deals 0.64 19.42 18.78 4789 2482
Table 8
Difference in CARs for deals with the most and least evenly matched bidder and target probabilities. This table classiﬁes bidder and target ﬁrms according to
whether the predicted probabilities for the bidder and target are evenly matched. The deals are identiﬁed as most evenly matched (least evenly matched) if the
difference in predicted probabilities is in the lowest (highest) twenty-ﬁfth percentile and the ﬁftieth percentile. The table only considers bidder and target pairs for
which probabilities and CARs for both parties to the merger are available. Table reports averages for differences in bidder and target ﬁrm predicted probabilities,
differences in 3-day CARs, and the number of deals in each category.
Difference in predicted probabilites for bidder and target Most evenly matched In-between match Least evenly matched
Difference in probabilities (top versus bottom 25%) Less than 2.11% Greater than 2.11% and less than 11.82% Greater than 11.82%
Mean difference in 3-day CAR 20.80% 22.99% 25.34%
N 227 453 227
Difference in probabilities (top versus bottom 50%) Less than 4.99% Greater than 4.99%
Mean difference in 3-day CAR 20.50% 25.57%
N 454 453
608 M.M. Cornett et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (2011) 595–611In contrast to Table 7 which classiﬁes bidders and targets into 7 probability bins regardless of whether the bidder and
target paired in the merger, Table 8 considers the 907 deals for which we have bidders and targets of the same merger.
Speciﬁcally, in Table 8 we examine deals in which the predicted probability to bid for the bidder and the predicted
probability to receive a bid for the target are most and least evenly matched. We then rank mergers based on the difference
in predicted probabilities for the bidder and target ﬁrms involved in the merger. As seen in Table 8, we classify a merger as
most and least evenly matched using two cutoffs: 1) the difference in predicted probabilities is in the bottom 25th
percentile in the difference ranking (most evenly matched) and in the top 25th percentile (least evenly matched); and 2)
the difference in predicted probabilities is in the bottom 50th percentile in the difference ranking (most evenly matched)
and in the top 50th percentile (least evenly matched). Table 8 reports the mean differences in bidder and target ﬁrm
predicted probabilities, the mean differences in three-day CARs, and the number of deals in each category. Table 8 shows
that using the 25% cutoff for identifying most evenly matched bidders and targets, the mean difference in predicted
probabilities is less than 2.11% and the mean difference in bidder and target 3-day CARs is 20.80%. These are the mergers in
which investors anticipate bidder and target candidacy most evenly. In contrast, using the 25% cutoff for identifying least
evenly matched bidders and targets, the mean difference in predicted probabilities is greater than 11.82% and the mean
difference in bidder and target 3-day CAR is 25.34%. These are the deals in which the greatest disparity in anticipation of
bidder and target candidacy exists. The difference in mean CARs for least evenly matched deals (25.34%) is signiﬁcantly
greater than the difference for most evenly matched deals (20.80%) at 5%. Using the 50% cutoff for identifying most evenly
matched bidders and targets, the mean difference in predicted probabilities is less than 4.99% and the mean difference in
bidder and target 3-day CARs is 20.50%. Using the 50% cutoff for identifying least evenly matched bidders and targets, the
mean difference in predicted probabilities is greater than 4.99% and the mean difference in bidder and target 3-day CAR is
25.57%. The difference in mean CARs for least evenly matched deals is signiﬁcantly greater than the difference for most
evenly matched deals at 1%. The results show that as the disparity in anticipation about bidder and target candidacy widens
so does the difference in bidder and target 3-day CARs.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates the extent to which investors anticipate bidder and target merger candidacy and if investor
anticipations about candidacy affect the distribution of value between bidder and target ﬁrm shareholders. Using a two-
stage multinomial framework, we investigate if and how investor anticipation of merger candidacy affects abnormal
returns that are measured around merger announcements. We ﬁnd that investors can predict bidder ﬁrms more
successfully than target ﬁrms. To investigate how value is distributed among bidder and target shareholders, we control
for different degrees of predictability in bidder and target selection. Once we account for greater predictability in bidder
ﬁrm candidacy, the difference between bidder and target ﬁrm three-day cumulative abnormal returns around a merger
announcement decreases signiﬁcantly. Thus, the evidence supports the hypothesis that to some extent the asymmetry in
investor anticipations of merger parties causes disparity in bidder and target ﬁrm announcement period abnormal
returns.
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This table lists descriptive statistics for the variables used to predict bidder and target ﬁrmmerger candidacy and management's motives for a merger. The sample
covers 26 years from 1979 to 2004. Based on SDC announcement dates for themerging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given year if it proposes
at least one bid in the next ﬁnancial statement release year (Panel A), a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a target ﬁrm if it solicits at least one bid in the next year (Panel B), and a
ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a non-merging ﬁrm in a given year if it neither proposes nor solicits a bid in the next year (Panel C). Panel D reports statistics for the full sample.
Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel A — bidders
Sales shock (%) 13.34 9.80 13.61 0.00 170.40
Sales shock squared (%) 3.63 0.96 10.85 0.00 290.35
Size (millions of $s) 2703 282 10,564 0.00 243,283
Change in size (%) 65.03 27.41 135.20 −86.33 1740.29
Sales growth (%) 63.56 26.61 145.04 −100.00 1863.80
Concentration ratio (%) 58.28 57.37 19.50 13.62 100.00
Resource-growth-mismatch 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
ROA (%) 0.04 5.04 25.53 −435.61 28.14
Share turnover (%) 123.39 81.35 120.29 0.43 630.90
Cash ratio (%) 9.23 4.04 12.33 0.00 83.68
Previous mergers 0.60 0.00 1.24 0.00 26
Dormant period (months) 4.22 1.00 10.68 1.00 172
Price run-up (%) 42.80 12.50 133.60 −96.06 1300.00
Information asymmetry 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00
Panel B — targets
Sales shock (%) 13.85 10.18 14.19 0.00 123.92
Sales shock squared (%) 3.93 1.04 10.56 0.00 153.56
Size (millions of $s) 920 97 4009 0.00 86,972
Change in size (%) 33.78 12.92 103.97 −86.14 1412.84
Sales growth (%) 41.73 17.05 122.97 −100.00 1881.75
Concentration ratio (%) 57.75 56.90 19.19 13.62 100.00
Resource-growth-mismatch 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
ROA (%) −5.91 2.71 29.53 −339.09 28.17
Share turnover (%) 105.22 71.77 104.78 0.37 635.12
Cash ratio (%) 8.66 3.20 12.25 0.00 85.46
Previous mergers 0.29 0.00 0.71 0.00 8.00
Dormant period (months) 3.89 1.00 9.47 1.00 166
Price run-up (%) 16.73 −4.24 106.43 −95.98 1155.71
Information asymmetry 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Panel C — non-merging ﬁrms
Sales shock (%) 12.70 9.36 14.59 0.00 786.07
Sales shock squared (%) 3.74 0.88 49.94 0.00 6179.05
Size (millions of $s) 1532 100 8728 0.00 750,507
Change in size (%) 34.06 14.02 102.11 −87.09 1777.51
Sales growth (%) 41.35 16.96 130.19 −100.00 2026.92
Concentration ratio (%) 59.00 58.60 20.32 13.62 100.00
Resource-growth-mismatch 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
ROA (%) −6.57 2.85 35.64 −504.40 28.17
Share turnover (%) 80.04 48.90 92.43 0.36 635.03
Cash ratio (%) 8.67 3.42 12.71 0.00 86.12
Previous mergers 0.12 0.00 0.43 0.00 11
Dormant period (months) 6.08 2.00 13.85 1.00 177
Price run-up (%) 24.47 −2.13 123.12 −96.26 1302.56
Information asymmetry 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
Panel D — All ﬁrms
Sales shock (%) 12.76 9.43 14.54 0.00 786.07
Sales shock squared (%) 3.74 0.89 48.02 0.00 6179.05
Size (millions of $s) 1574 105 8736 0.00 750,507
Change in size (%) 35.61 14.59 104.30 −87.09 1777.51
Sales growth (%) 42.48 17.41 130.86 −100.00 2026.92
Concentration ratio (%) 58.93 58.48 20.25 13.62 100.00
Resource-growth-mismatch 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
ROA (%) −6.22 2.97 35.07 −504.40 28.17
Share turnover (%) 82.94 51.12 94.95 0.36 635.12
Cash ratio (%) 8.70 3.44 12.68 0.00 86.12
Previous mergers 0.15 0.00 0.52 0.00 26
Dormant period (months) 5.92 1.00 13.61 1.00 177
Price run-up (%) 25.17 −1.40 123.29 −96.26 1302.56
Information asymmetry 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
Appendix A. Descriptive statistics of variables used to predict bidder and target ﬁrm merger candidacy
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This table lists descriptive statistics for the variables used to explain merger announcement cumulative abnormal returns. The sample covers 26 years from the
1979 through 2004. Based on SDC announcement dates for themerging ﬁrm sample, a ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a bidder ﬁrm in a given year if it proposes at least one bid
in the next ﬁnancial statement release year (Panel A) and ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a target ﬁrm if it receives at least one bid in the next year (Panel B). Panel C reports
statistics for the bidders and targets together.
Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel A — bidders
All equity 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Anti-takeover defense 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00
Unwelcoming attitude 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00
Target bankrupt 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00
Target status 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Same industry 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Same state 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Deal value (billions of $) 0.49 0.05 2.69 0.00 89.17
Relative value (%) 0.39 0.12 0.73 0.00 8.06
Panel B — targets
All equity 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Anti-takeover defense 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00
Unwelcoming attitude 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00
Target bankrupt 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00
Bidder status 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00
Same industry 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Same state 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00
Deal value (billions of $) 1.11 0.12 5.43 0.00 164.75
Relative value (%) 1.80 1.61 1.01 0.04 8.11
Panel C — all ﬁrms
All equity 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Anti-takeover defense 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00
Unwelcoming attitude 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
Target bankrupt 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00
Status 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Same industry 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Same state 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00
Deal value (billions of $) 0.73 0.07 4.00 0.00 164.75
Relative value (%) 0.94 0.51 1.10 0.00 8.11
Appendix B. Description of variables used to explain merger announcement cumulative abnormal returns
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